 On the anniversary of the battle of Fallujah, Mike Zacchea, who fought and was wounded there, talks about his experience preparing for the assault.
A year ago, I was the senior battalion advisor for the 5th Battalion, 3rd Brigade of the Iraqi 5th Division. We were stationed at al-Taji Military Complex, defending the base perimeter and conducting offensive operations against the insurgents operating in/around al-Taji. The battalion had 510 Iraqi soldiers, including officers and Staff NCOs.
Myself with members of Iraqi staff
Our battalion had been blooded by that time, having been engaged against the insurgents virtually daily since the beginning of August. We’d had 10 wounded, and had accounted for 9 insurgents KIA and some 55 captured. On Oct 20th, we received a warning order from Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq to prepare to participate in a hypothetical assault on an unnamed city in Iraq. Unofficially, we all knew it was Fallujah.
Our activity during the end of October was frenetic. All the advisors were working 20 hours a day to prepare the battalion for the battle. Administratively, it was a nightmare. The soldiers threw away their Army ID cards as fast as we could make them, so we made what we called “medical” ID cards they would need to get American medical care. Logistically, the tasks of issuing new combat-ready gear to each soldier and planning for and embarking the battalion were daunting. Operationally, simultaneously planning the tactical turnover, training for the assault, and maintaining operational security was extremely difficult. In general, we advisors tried not to throw too much at the Iraqis at one time because they did not deal well with complexity.
On October 24th, I awoke at 0400 to discover that 3/4s of the battalion had disappeared sometime between midnight and 4 AM. No one, neither the perimeter guards nor the Iraqi military police patrolling the base, had reported the mass exodus of 350+ soldiers. The battalion commander had disappeared as well. It had the odor of disaster. I and the Iraqi battalion executive officer had to answer hard questions from various generals, both American and Iraqi. They needed a no-bullshit answer: Would the battalion be able to deploy or not? My tour, the 7 months we’d been in Iraq training and leading the battalion, for us everything hung in the balance. The spectre of failure loomed large for our advisor team and the battalion.
Myself with Major Saeed and Mohammed Najm
Soldiers began to trickle back on the 26th. Questioned by their leadership, they told us they just left to bring home some personal belongings and say goodbye to their families. The battalion XO and I discussed punishment, but it didn’t make sense; we couldn’t punish the soldiers who came back to fight, while the ones who didn’t come back would be unpunished. In the absence of the battalion commander, the executive officer issued a blanket amnesty with my approval. Within a couple of days, the battalion had more than 440 soldiers ready to go; and the battalion commander “reappeared.”
Major Saeed before assault
We were given a window for movement. We tried to keep the Iraqis at once honed for the fight, without getting complacent; but also we needed to keep them in the dark about the real movement time. So we held numerous dress rehearsals at all times of the day and night, each time telling them it was for real. We would line the convoy up, issue weapons and ammunition, go through our accountability drills, and drive out the gate as if we were going to Fallujah; only to turn back before actually getting on the road. This served two purposes; to get them used to it, and to deceive any insurgents (on or off base) who were watching our movements.
Ambush at al-Sholla
Nov 2nd, was the real convoy. The morning was gray and a rare drizzle was falling. The 70 km trip took us 6 ½ hours. We were ambushed twice, once at al-Sholla, and again at Abu Ghraib. All told we had 1 KIA and 16 WIA, and lost 4 vehicles to IEDs and enemy machine gun, RPG, and mortar fire. When we pulled into the East Fallujah Iraqi Camp that afternoon, we were bloody and ragged. We still had to go to work, planning and training for the assault. Anticipation of the battle hung over us all, Iraqi and American alike.
Burning of Fallujah
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