Ray Kimball was a Captain in Kuwait for 2 months and Iraq for three months. He was part of the original invasion force with 3-7 Cavalry and commanded F Troop, 3-7 Cavalry, which was the aviation maintenance and support troop for the squadron's 16 aircraft. He gave up command of F Troop in June of 2003 and returned to the United States to begin graduate studies in History at Stanford University. His next assignment will be as an Associate Professor of History at the United States Military Academy. His awards include the Bronze Star, the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, and the Humanitarian Service Medal. He is married to an active duty officer and they have one son.

Read more about Ray Kimball in the Palo Alto Weekly.

The following is a narrative he wrote to his colleagues:

"We LDed and promptly jumped on a 300-km road march through some of the worst trails I've ever seen. In some cases it was literally straight line navigation across the desert (thank God for GPS). The tracks jumped well out in front of us, and we raced to try to catch up, which took about a day. Movement control broke down completely, and we had elements of 2nd BCT all intermixed with us. The resulting dust clouds and confusion caused some terrible accidents, including one meeting engagement between an M88, a HEMMT Wrecker, and a 5-ton. By some miracle no one was killed in any of these. We finally got to As Samawah after forty-eight straight hours of convoying. The aircraft were already there and were struggling to fly missions on the minimal support I could get forward. Once we got the main body there, things evened out a little bit."

"As Samawah was a complete surprise. Intel had told us it was a friendly city, and that we might even be in a parade once we got there. The truth was very different. The aircraft would frequently see groups of kids waving, and a guy with an AK fifteen feet behind them firing away. Credit the pilots; they flew smart and kept the aircraft out of some real nasty spots. I don't think I ever saw one of our KWs above fifty feet; they were real smart about using scout-gun mixes, and vigorously suppressing anything they took fire from. We went through Hellfires like they were going out of style. This was partially due to a shortage of rockets, and mostly due to the need to minimize collateral damage through point weapons systems. We put HFs in everything; ADA systems, trucks, tracks, you name it. One aircrew even used a HF against a building to mark it for CAS, which works better than you might think. We used a mix of F and K model missiles, which performed much better than the A and C models we use in training. I don't know of any misfires attributed to the missile."

"The aircraft held up incredibly well throughout the campaign. I attribute this to a couple of things. First, simplicity of design in the aircraft itself. Compared to all the systems in the Hawk and Apache, this aircraft is fairly easy to maintain and keep flying. This was especially key since we saw zero repair parts pushed to us during the entire campaign (yes, you read that right). The second key was the dedication of the crewchiefs and maintainers. I watched crewchiefs doggedly pursue problems on their aircraft in the worst of conditions, in one case literally pulling a poncho over top of himself so we could work on an oil cooler while a sandstorm raged around him. Crewchiefs pulled every form of preventive maintenance they could, and didn't rest until their aircraft was as ready as it could be. My engine change team did two engine changes in less than 12 hours each, which is simply unheard of. They did it safely too, requiring very little follow-on maintenance. The final element was EBF (Engine Barrier Filter). We got them fielded on our aircraft right before deployment, and I firmly believe they made the difference between two engine changes versus the six or seven that could have happened. The addedbonus was the additional power margin that EBF gives you; that extra four or five percent probably saved a few aircraft from some crashes or hard landing in heavy, hot conditions. Pass the word on; if they don't have EBF, they need to bitch, kick, scream, and make noise through USR or whatever means they have to get it fielded. It's a little tougher to maintain than the particle separator, but well worth it."

"The next step was a convoy up along the Euphrates to a crossing point near An Najaf. You've probably already heard the stories about that convoy and the ambushes, so I won't go into it, expect to say that if we'd been able to put aircraft up (weather was terrible), it would have been a very different story. We'd still have fought our way up, but we wouldn't have had near the amount of surprises we had. The ground troops fought some amazing fights, at one point going black on everything they had, including 9mm ammo. Those guys are heroes and they deserve every bit of acclamation they get. For our part, we huddled the field trains on an elevated dike road in the middle of farmland and watched the fight. Monitoring the net and hearing what was happening, I was convinced that some portion of the squadron was going to get overrun and we would have to get into it. Thank God that never happened. We finally got relieved after 3 days and went to a division refit area. "

"The next step was movement on Baghdad itself, which meant moving through a 10 km wide gap near the city of Karbala. Every intel projection said we were going to get slimed as we went through. I was absolutely convinced of it; the Karbala Gap was the last real natural obstacle that Saddam could use in defending Baghdad, other than the Euphrates itself. So we drove through the gap into the night in MOPP 2, and I waited for that call to mask up. It never came, much to my surprise. To this day I'll never know why he didn't slime us. We know he gave the release order to subordinate commanders; maybe they had a little more sense than he did and decided they wanted to live. Either way, we passed through the gap without incident and set up in the desert to the west of Baghdad. We were all set to push across the river with the squadron when the division commander ordered that no aircraft would operate east of the Euphrates. I understand his intent; he was worried about the aircraft ge tting shot down in an urban environment, and us having our own little "Blackhawk Down." I still think it was the wrong decision. Everybody (especially the Apaches) had learned their lesson about how you do and don't fly in cities, and we could have really made a difference. But I guess that's why he makes the big bucks."

'We finally crossed over into Baghdad a few days later and sat there. We occupied Iraqi airways' engine shop, and promptly raided it for all the parts and POL we could muster. At first we spent most of our time getting ready to go home, and then supporting SASO in Baghdad and Fallujah (this was before the insurgency really got off the ground). I came out of command on the 13th of June and redeployed on 20 June 2003;the rest of the troop came home in mid-August"

~ Raymond A. Kimball

  Captain, U.S. Cavalry

   ultima ratio regum

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