OVERALL: As I read this, a favorite saying of Patton's kept running through my mind: "L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace." This report is breathtaking in its scope, its comprehensiveness and in the originality of its proposals. With one major reservation (see bottom) I am very impressed with this product - I think it represents the clearest and most complete thinking to date on the situation in Iraq. I've broken down my thoughts into three categories: Visionary, Needs Work, Not to Standard. (Good, Bad and Ugly didn't really cut it for this - as I said, I'm pleased with the vast majority of this document). Direct citations from the document are in italics.

Visionary (great ideas, well executed)

The report leads off with an excellent summary of the current situation. You can quibble with individual figures (as I do - see below in "Not to Standard"), but the overall picture is comprehensive - and sobering. Some examples: The insurgency comprises former elements of the Saddam Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals. It has significant support within the Sunni Arab community. The insurgency has no single leadership but is a network of networks. (3-4)
Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both the capability to hold areas that have been cleared and the will to clear neighborhoods that are home to Shiite militias. U.S. forces can "clear" any neighborhood, but there are neither enough U.S. troops present nor enough support from Iraqi security forces to "hold" neighborhoods so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq. Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. and Iraqi military forces are fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging the sectarian violence, U.S. forces seem to be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end. (12)
Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political party that controls basic services within the government and an armed militia outside of the government. (15)
One senior American general commented that the Iraqis "still do not know what kind of country they want to have." Yet many of Iraq's most powerful and well positioned leaders are not working toward a united Iraq. (19)
Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that 150,000 to 200,000-and perhaps as many as 500,000-barrels of oil per day are being stolen. Controlled prices for refined products result in shortages within Iraq, which drive consumers to the thriving black market. One senior U.S. official told us that corruption is more responsible than insurgents for breakdowns in the oil sector. (24)
The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense Department, State Department, United States Agency for International Development, and other agencies has been ineffective. There are no clear lines establishing who is in charge of reconstruction. (25)
To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion on the Iraq War, and costs are running about $8 billion per month. In addition, the United States must expect significant "tail costs" to come. Caring for veterans and replacing lost equipment will run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Estimates run as high as $2 trillion for the final cost of the U.S. involvement in Iraq. (32)

And my personal favorite - All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by Americans' lack of language and cultural understanding. Our embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level of fluency. (92)

Alternate COAs (pp37-43) - None of these are "throwaway COAs" or strawmen - the commission does a great job explaining why these ideas are not viable as a standalone or as a separate part of a unified whole.

From the beginning of the recommendations section, the Panel makes it clear that they understand the broader context of this task, and how that broader context shapes and effects our options in Iraq. Again, the language is stunning and sobering: Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To put it simply, all key issues in the Middle East-the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism and terrorism-are inextricably linked.(44)  

There is a frank recognition throughout the document that other will need incentives to cooperate with the kind of far-reaching ideas involved here. For instance: RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return the Golan Heights [to Syria], with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties.(55)  

There is also a recognition that a significant amount of humility will be need on our part to admit that a) we need the help and b) we're not entirely in control of this process. For instance: RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch.(68) RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. force presence must be on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase the possibilities for success. (67) There will be domestic political actors who will not be happy about this, but it cannot become a cudgel for one party to beat the other with in 2008 - the stakes are too high.  

Everybody needs to come and play. It's not just about money - it's about participation and possible efforts for local actors to improve themselves at the same time - again, incentives for participation are crucial. The United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and some Arab League members need to become hands-on participants in Iraq's reconstruction. RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq should be greater involvement by and with international partners, who should do more than just contribute money. They should also actively participate in the design and construction of projects.(87)

Finally, the Panel recognizes that if we're going to call this fight critical to our national security, it's time to start putting the rest of the government on the same war footing that DoD and CIA have been on for the last four years. This includes both short-term and long-term measures, such as: A Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq is required. He or she should report to the President, be given a staff and funding, and chair a National Security Council interagency group consisting of senior principals at the undersecretary level from all relevant U.S. government departments and agencies. The Senior Advisor's responsibility must be to bring unity of effort to the policy, budget, and implementation of economic reconstruction programs in Iraq. The Senior Advisor must act as the principal point of contact with U.S. partners in the overall reconstruction effort. (88) RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the President's annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal budget process should not be circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight. (91-2) RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq.(93) RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies-Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others- respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade's Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade's operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.(93) RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should train personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with a complex stability operation outside of the traditional embassy setting. It should establish a Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar technical assistance capabilities.(93)
I should also note that the last two of these, if implemented, would be a huge on how we conduct outreach and stability programs. They are probably the most revolutionary changes in this document, but since they're buried at the end, they'll probably be overlooked by most observers.

Needs Work (those ideas that I think are great in concept, but need some more fleshing out)  

 There is an overarching problem with all the recommendations made that involve either changing the Iraqi government and/or changing regional security agreements: the very fact that we're the one making the suggestion means it will be immediately viewed with suspicion and/or alarm by the very people we're trying to influence. We need to start finding other folks besides us to advocate this, and if that means giving up some of the credit, so be it. I'm reminded of a Truman quote: "It's amazing what you can accomplish when you don't care who gets the credit." Specifically, all of the milestones on pp 62-63, and recommendations 50-54 on pp. 78-80 are areas where the idea should largely appear to have originated with the Iraqis themselves or a third party, rather than with us.  

The Panel's idea of the Iraq International Support Group is truly visionary and could be a first step to a larger regional security organization: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself. (49)This is an incredibly audacious idea - the problem will be getting all of these traditional rivals to believe that the others will honor their promises. What is needed is a "honest broker" who can be equally trusted by all sides, and by virtue of our unconditional support for Israel and threats of regime change elsewhere, we don't fit the bill. Perhaps an EU or UN body?

Pages 53-54 include some great ideas of good reasons to get Syria and Iran on board, and potential ways to do it. However, it neglects any real discussion of their internal political processes, and which constituencies in those countries would stand to lose by such an accommodation. We cannot view the countries as monoliths - they have domestic politics just like we do.

RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support the presence of neutral international experts as advisors
to the Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.(69)
RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide financial and technical support and establish a single office in
Iraq to coordinate assistance to the Iraqi government and its expert advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize, and
reintegrate militia members. (69) I would love to see a comprehensive program for DDR, but who's got the expertise and manpower to do it on this scale? I hate to say it, but I see this boomeranging back to DoD.  

Not to Standard (assertions that just don't square with the facts, or simply won't work)

The number of imbedded personnel would be based on the recommendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but it should be large enough to accelerate the development of a real combat capability in Iraqi Army units. (71)  We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective. (73) We continue to reiterate the mantra of "the commanders on the ground will determine the size of our forces" when we have seen persistent evidence to the contrary - that senior commanders on the ground in Iraq are, in fact, allowing themselves to be influenced by domestic political considerations and are not asking for what they need in terms of troop strength. It pains me greatly to say that, but I don't know any other way to put it. We have a Joint Staff for a reason, last time I checked - time to get them in this fight and do a real troop-to-task assessment for what's needed here. This is by far the weakest part of the report - they hint that a short-term surge of US troops might be necessary, but completely fail to make any kind of assessment on what kind of units might be needed.

There are roughly 5,000 civilian contractors in the country.(7) I cannot imagine how they arrived at this number, but even the most conservative estimates far exceed this. See, for instance, this recent WaPo article. This is not mere semantics - the growing presence of contractors on the battlefield greatly complicates everything from force protection to Status of Forces Agreements. This is an issue that must be addressed and quickly.

The report briefly addresses Afghanistan in one page, which I think is both an overreach and a misstep. An errant missive in an otherwise well-focused document.